118 исторических миниатюр и 108 авторских текстов на 13 иностранных языках. Сборник

Залесский Владимир Владимирович

And, despite the fact that one of the coalition was been replacing with another, England did not stop uninterruptedly - almost 12 years (if we count from 1803) - to fight against Napoleon.

And if you count not from 1803, but from the beginning of 1793, when the French National Convention (Convention nationale) declared war on England, and to subtract approximately one year of duration of "peace of Amiens", it turns out - about 21 years!

About 21 years of active military contraposition! Such historical phenomenon is deserving attention, dear mister Kamensky, doesn't seem to you? In such difficult situation England had a complex of the most difficult questions: budgetary, personnel, internal political and others!'

– 'England was separated from Napoleon's army by the Strait,' - Kamensky have reminded .
– 'England had a strong fleet which has broken the Spanish-French fleet in the Trafalgar battle in 1805. England could resist to Napoleon nearly 12 years uninterruptedly (from 1803 to 1815): Napoleon couldn't destroy England.

Absolutely other situation - the Russia, which has received in 1807 extensive overland border with the Empire of Napoleon.

And what would be the history of Russia, if not were concluded the Treaties of Tilsit?

Russia, like all European continental countries, including France, have discovered a desire for a rapid resolution of the accumulated problems in battles.

Austerlitz: Kutuzov has been inclined to evade from resolute fight; the Russian Emperor Alexander I accelerated events.

Quick, lightning, galloping victories were in the style of Napoleon.

We can assume that the continental European powers tend to minimize the duration of an armed confrontation.

Habit? Features of economic and governmental systems?

I will allow myself to to offer for comparison an illustration from another historical period: sir Francis Drake. Whole periods of his life were periods of armed confrontation. The sea battle of the English fleet with the Spanish Invincible Armada in 1588 did not pass in the form of a General battle. It was a multi-day fighting, in which in favor of the English fleet were maximally used natural factors and different circumstances.

At the time of Francis Drake England was not the rich country. And now we will assume that the country becomes rich, that economic and state systems allow to distribute the period of military contraposition for many years. For example, 20 years.

Fight of armies turns into fight of the governmental, budgetary systems!'

Kamensky smiled.

– 'You, mister Insarov, will reach during your fantastic constructions to the point, when you remember, except England, also Spain, whose population resisted to Napoleon's troops in 1808-1814. Nearly 6 years! You will find some analogies between defense of Zaragoza in 1809 ("each house has turned into fortress") and fights for Stalingrad in 1942. Moreover you will also make the Central staff of the guerrilla movement in the sequence of the reasonings.

You will remember mass evacuation to the Urals and beyond the Urals. Updating of top military personnel...

You, mister Insarov, will reach in your fantastic mental constructions unto the "association" the "Peace of Tilsit" with "the Anglo-Spanish model of armed confrontation"...'

– 'That is, did "Peace of Tilsit" have no alternative?' - summed up the hypothetical reasoning Insarov.

Kamensky has smiled:

– 'Who can tell whether Russia had sufficient resources for long and continuous confrontation on "the English sample". Resources for the long-term (armed) confrontation? There was no "Strait factor". And budgetary process? Financing of expenses on army, other expenses? And what about general functionality and flexibility of state machinery?

Several years of defensive armed struggle in the own territory - without "Strait factor" - put the enormous, surpassing any imaginations, tasks before the state!

Quick victory is perceived as a manifestation of the art of war. The protracted war has always been understood as a disaster.

The struggle of Spanish people's masses against the French invaders was accompanied by disasters. The alternative was obedience. The Spaniards chose disobedience and protracted war in the period 1808-1814 years. However, it was primarily a guerrilla war.

Interestingly, that the talented French general Moro who was hostile to Napoleon, gave to heads of the anti-Napoleonic coalition in 1813 recommendation: "Do not attack those parts of the army, where Napoleon himself, and attack only on the marshals".

The general Moro put a victory on the first place? At any cost?

In the territory of Portugal and in the neighboring regions of Spain - along with the guerrilla groups, - the English expeditionary corps operated, which had landed in 1808 on the Iberian Peninsula. Corps included the some units of the Spanish army.

There was appeared unique Anglo-Spanish experience of prolonged war: based on very functional government institutions (English), effective budgetary process (English), on the broad people's guerrilla movement (Spanish).

Napoleon said: "The war must feed itself." It is unlikely that this approach suited to the signs of a commonly understood effective budget process. His maneuvering during the warfare was quick and skillful. His crushing victories quickly turned into conditions of peace, into diplomatic achievements.

It is possible to believe hypothetically that the history "traced" two models of armed confrontation: Anglo-Spanish and Napoleonic.'

Insarov, having understood that reasonings gain more and more presumable character, have decided to make a pause.

Kamensky, however, was fond of discussion:

– 'Let's say Russia has decided to sign the Treaties of Tilsit. May be, the "peace of Tilsit" was connected with intense preparation of the future opponents for the expected collision (Napoleonic France prepared for a campaign to Russia approximately since 1810). Let's say, that after intense and relatively long training followed a relatively short time of an armed confrontation.