Гражданская война, террор и бандитизм (Систематизация социологии и социальная динамика)
Шрифт:
The U.S.S.R. also had a treaty with Czechoslovakia, and it
indicated willingness to cooperate with France and Great Britain
if they decided to come to Czechoslovakia's defense, but the
Soviet Union and its potential services were ignored throughout
the crisis.
As Hitler continued to make inflammatory speeches demanding that
Germans in Czechoslovakia be reunited with their homeland, war
seemed imminent. Neither France nor Britain felt prepared to
defend Czechoslovakia, however, and both were anxious to avoid a
military confrontation with Germany at almost any cost. In
mid-September, Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister,
offered to go to Hitler's retreat at Berchtesgaden to discuss the
situation personally with the F?hrer. Hitler agreed to take no
military action without further discussion, and Chamberlain agreed
to try to persuade his cabinet and the French to accept the
results of a plebiscite in the Sudetenland. The French premier,
?douard Daladier, and his foreign minister, Georges Bonnet, then
went to London, where a joint proposal was prepared stipulating
that all areas with a population that was more than 50 percent
Sudeten German be returned to Germany. The Czechoslovaks were not
consulted. The Czechoslovak government initially rejected the
proposal but was forced to accept it reluctantly on September 21.
On September 22 Chamberlain again flew to Germany and met Hitler
at Godesberg, where he was dismayed to learn that Hitler had
stiffened his demands: he now wanted the Sudetenland occupied by
the German army and the Czechoslovaks evacuated from the area by
September 28. Chamberlain agreed to submit the new proposal to the
Czechoslovaks, who rejected it, as did the British cabinet and the
French. On the 24th the French ordered a partial mobilization: the
Czechoslovaks had ordered a general mobilization one day earlier.
In a last-minute effort to avoid war, Chamberlain then proposed
that a four-power conference be convened immediately to settle the
dispute. Hitler agreed, and on September 29, Hitler, Chamberlain,
Daladier, and the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini met in
Munich, where Mussolini introduced a written plan that was
accepted by all as the Munich agreement. (Many years later it was
discovered that the so-called Italian plan had been prepared in
the German Foreign Office.) It was almost identical to the
Godesberg proposal: the German army was to complete the occupation
of the Sudetenland by October 10, and an international commission
would decide the future of other disputed areas. Czechoslovakia
was informed by Britain and France that it could either resist
Germany alone or submit to the prescribed annexations. The
Czechoslovak government chose to submit.
Before leaving Munich, Chamberlain and Hitler signed a paper
declaring their mutual desire to resolve differences through
consultation to assure peace. Both Daladier and Chamberlain
returned home to jubilant, welcoming crowds relieved that the
threat of war had passed, and Chamberlain told the British public
that he had achieved "peace with honour. I believe it is peace in
our time."
Chamberlain's policies were discredited the following year, when
Hitler annexed the remainder of Czechoslovakia in March and then
precipitated World War II by invading Poland in September. The
Munich agreement became a byword for the futility of appeasing
expansionist totalitarian states, although it did buy time for the
Allies to increase their military preparedness.
Copyright (c) 1996 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. All Rights
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Итак, Чехословакия имела хорошие гарантии, которые моментально исчезли, когда встал вопрос об их реализации. Мало того, что гаранты не выполнили свои обещания, они обвинили свою жертву во всех мыслимых и немыслимых грехах.
К вопросу о гарантах и гарантиях следует добавит слова "компромис" и "умиротворение". Дискуссия о соглашении в Ольстере шла под моим заголовком "THERE ARE NO COMPROMISES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM". Не имея возможности и не желая выполнить свои обязательства, гаранты выступают в роли миротворцев и ищут "компромис" между конфликтующими сторонами. Лучшие друзья превращаются в злейших врагов.
Вот мнение о миротворцах и сторонниках компромисов изложенное Larry Ball в двух посланиях. Я сконструировал из них одно и надеюсь автор простит меня.
Subject: Re: THERE ARE NO COMPROMISES IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST TERRORISM
Date: Wed, 22 Apr 1998 18:37:34 -0500
From: larry ball [email protected]
I agree with this poster about the situation in Northern Ireland.
Settlement of this issue has been attempted many times since Lord